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REOPENING THE LOOPHOLE: AVOIDING SECURITIES 
FRAUD DEBT THROUGH BANKRUPTCY 
Andrew L. Van Houter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
H.E. Pennypacker was a high-powered securities dealer whose 
clients were mostly small-time investors.  Pennypacker routinely took 
advantage of his unsophisticated clients, many of them immigrants 
with little command of the English language.  Pennypacker used his 
charm and savvy sales skills to induce investors to hand over their life 
savings for him to invest.  Pennypacker, however, failed to explain the 
risks to his clients and omitted material information in the 
prospectus.  After many complaints from investors who lost their 
savings, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated 
and ultimately brought charges against Pennypacker.  Pennypacker 
settled the case for $250,000 without admitting liability.  He then 
immediately filed for bankruptcy, never intending to pay the 
settlement he signed with the SEC.  Since his bankruptcy, 
Pennypacker opened a new brokerage firm1 and continues to defraud 
 
* J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science, Lander 
College for Men, Touro College.  Thank you to Professor Stephen J. Lubben, 
Professor Kristin N. Johnson, and Marissa Litwin for their comprehensive comments 
and guidance. 
 1  Although the SEC may have prevented Pennypacker from opening a new 
brokerage firm by exercising its powers to revoke the registration of broker dealers, 
see Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2010); Investment 
Company Act of 1940 § 42(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2006); The Securities Act of 1933 § 
20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 
U.S.C. § 78a (2006), revocation of registration is not automatic.  “The Commission 
generally focuses its limited resources in the broker-dealer examination program on 
firms with the greatest potential for significant financial risk and risk to material 
violations of the securities laws.  The leading type of examination in recent years is 
the cause examination,” which is based on a tip or complaint.  SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF 
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT A-14 (2011).  
“In recent years, approximately 94% of examinations concluded with a deficiency 
letter which summarizes . . . findings and requests corrective action.”  Id. at A-15.  
While the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), as a self-regulatory 
organization, has the authority to sanction its members, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 §§ 15A(b), 19(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006), there were only 211 license 
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investors.2  Given recent trends in the financial sector, these facts 
strike an emotional chord and highlight the sensibility of 
guaranteeing that all settlements for securities laws violations survive 
a bankruptcy petition.  This would thereby ensure that dishonest 
debtors would be unable to hide behind the law to the detriment of 
their honest and unfortunate creditors. 
A slight variation of the facts, however, reveals the harsh 
ramifications of implementing a blanket bankruptcy protection that 
automatically attaches to all settlements for securities violations.  
Consider Art Vandelay, the one-time owner of a small mattress retail 
store in Anytown, U.S.A.  With dreams of moving into a bigger and 
better location on Main Street, Art Vandelay needed to raise capital.  
Vandelay mentioned his plans over Thanksgiving dinner and Janice, 
a friend of his mother’s, agreed to invest.  Vandelay, excited about 
the prospect of expanding his business, accepted $100,000 from 
Janice, and, in return, issued Janice thirty-five percent of the 
company’s shares, which were not registered with the local Bureau of 
Securities.3  When business slowed and Vandelay’s mattress store no 
longer made a profit, Janice sued Vandelay for issuing unregistered 
securities.  Vandelay casually mentioned the story to a friend who told 
Vandelay that not all securities need to be registered and his may be 
exempt.  Vandelay calculated that it would be cheaper to just settle 
the case and did so for $25,000 without admitting liability.  In reality, 
Vandelay’s shares were exempt from the state’s registration 
requirements.  Vandelay paid the annuities on the settlement at first, 
but a few years later, his home was foreclosed on and Vandelay was 
 
suspensions and 159 license revocations out of the 6,387 examinations it conducted 
into broker-dealers based on tips or complaints in 2010.  SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra, 
at A-12.  Thus, while it is possible that Pennypacker could have been prevented from 
opening another brokerage firm, it is by no means a given.  Furthermore, even if 
Pennypacker’s license were suspended or revoked, he may, as an unscrupulous 
fraudster, attempt to continue to do business until he is stopped.  Therefore, this 
hypothetical is entirely possible.   
 2  See Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: The 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Securities Arbitration, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 307, 308–09 
(2007), on which this hypothetical is based.   
 3  Each state has its own agency dedicated to regulating state securities laws.  
Mark J. Astarita, Guide to State Securities Administrators, SEC LAW.COM, 
http://www.seclaw.com/stcomm.htm (last updated Nov. 9, 2011).  In New Jersey, for 
example, that agency is the Bureau of Securities.  N. J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-66 (West 
1997); see also Fact Sheet: New Jersey Bureau of Securities, NEW JERSEY BUREAU OF 
SECURITIES, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/bos/bosoverview.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2012) (“The Bureau of Securities within the New Jersey office of the Attorney 
General is the state’s securities regulatory agency.”). 
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forced into bankruptcy before fully paying the settlement.  Because 
all settlements resolving claims of securities laws violations survive 
bankruptcy, Vandelay must continue to pay the settlement payments 
to Janice and the substantial debt effectively bars Vandelay from 
receiving a financial fresh start.4  Clearly, these facts curb the 
emotional reaction that the first story elicits, and cause one to 
reconsider issuing an all-inclusive bankruptcy immunity to all 
settlements for claims of securities laws violations. 
We are thus presented with a dilemma: Do we utilize the 
bankruptcy code to protect investors at the risk of harming innocent 
debtors like Art Vandelay, the mattress store owner?  Or do we allow 
innocent creditors, like the unsophisticated investors duped by 
Pennypacker, to be harmed for the sake of preserving debtors’ rights 
to a fresh start?  This Comment will explain how and why the current 
law treats both cases the same and suggests possible distinctions that 
should be implemented through amendment to the bankruptcy code 
based on public policy. 
To fully appreciate the policy dilemma, it is important to have a 
basic understanding of fundamental bankruptcy principals and 
concepts.  The main policy behind the federally created bankruptcy 
code is to grant debtors a means to achieve a financial fresh start.5  As 
the Supreme Court stated, bankruptcy “gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
pre-existing debt.”6  In other words, bankruptcy provides the much-
needed compassion in a capitalistic society.7  Employing the 
discharge accomplishes this goal.8  Essentially, the discharge releases 
 
 4  See Teresa H. Pearson, What Bankruptcy Lawyers Need to Know About the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 
FINDLAW (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Mar/26/132662.html, 
on which this hypothetical is based.  
 5  BANKR. JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 6 
(rev. 3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts 
/FederalCourts/BankruptcyResources/bankbasics2011.pdf. 
 6  Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).  
 7  The American “fresh start” concept is a uniquely liberal bankruptcy concept 
that is not completely duplicated in other developed countries.  See Iain Ramsay, 
Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241, 250–51 (2007); UDO 
REITNER ET AL., CONSUMER OVERINDEBTEDNESS AND CONSUMER LAW IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 165–66 (2003), available at http://www.ecri.eu/new/system/files/26 
+consumer_overindebtedness_consumer_law_eu.pdf.  The American broad fresh 
start, however, is counterbalanced by the non-existence of a broader social safety net 
like those present in European countries.  See Ramsay, supra, at 245–47.  
 8  BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5, at 6; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006) 
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a debtor from all personal liability from certain debts.9  Once a 
discharge occurs, creditors are forbidden from attempting to collect 
the debt.10  Creditors are even barred from harassing the debtor 
about the debts through phone calls, letters, or any other means of 
communication.11 
The discharge, however, does not apply to all debts.12  The 
bankruptcy code lists certain types of debts that survive a discharge.13  
The statutory exceptions to discharge reflect Congress’s conscious 
policy decision that preserving the ability to collect certain types of 
debts is of greater importance than granting debtors a fresh start.14  
Therefore, if an exception from discharge applies, the debt will 
survive bankruptcy and remain collectable.  For that reason, debts 
resulting from wrongful or dishonest conduct are generally not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.15  The underpinning of the policy is 
obvious; Congress created the discharge to give the honest debtor a 
fresh start,16 but the dishonest debtor deserves no such protection.17  
Thus, many dischargeability debates focus on the two goals of 
protecting honest debtors and preventing dishonest fraudsters from 
evading liability by hiding behind the bankruptcy code.18 
One such exception from discharge based on debt incurred 
through wrongful conduct is the securities-claims exception of 
section 523(a)(19).19  Congress added this exception to discharge as 
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which, in turn, was a 
response to corporate fraud.20  As the legislative history makes clear, 
Congress intended that the securities-claims exception prevent 
 
(describing the effects of a discharge).  
 9  BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5, at 6.  
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. at 9.  
 12  See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (listing all the exceptions to discharge).  
 13  Id.  
 14  Honorable Bernice B. Donald & Kenneth J. Cooper, Collateral Estoppel in 
Section 523(c) Dischargeability Proceedings: When is a Default Judgment Actually Litigated?, 
12 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1995–96).  
 15  Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (excepting from discharge debt 
incurred by fraud); § 523(a)(4) (excepting from discharge debt incurred by fraud 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity); § 523(a)(6) (excepting from discharge debt 
incurred by willful and malicious injury); § 523(a)(11) (excepting from discharge 
debt incurred by fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity to a bank).  
 16  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 17  Donald & Cooper, supra note 14, at 323.  
 18  Id. at 323–24. 
 19  See § 523(a)(19).  
 20  See infra Part II.A.  
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fraudsters from using the bankruptcy code to evade debts for their 
wrongdoings.21  Prior to the exception’s enactment, many cases 
resulted in investors failing to collect their awards because fraudsters 
received bankruptcy protection after losing or settling securities 
claims.22  Many small investors forfeited their entire life-savings and 
pursued an expensive lawsuit to recover their losses, only to be 
denied any recovery because of a loophole in the bankruptcy code.23  
As one commentator put it, “[t]he defrauded small investor [was] left 
without any further recourse and a much lighter purse.  The 
unscrupulous brokerage firm or broker receive[ed] [a] discharge 
order . . . and trot[ted] off into the sunset emboldened to defraud yet 
another investor.”24  The securities-claims exception is meant to 
prevent that situation and close the loophole.25 
The exception to discharge for debt resulting from securities 
laws violations exempts from discharge all debt that is (1) for the 
violation of any securities laws; and (2) is memorialized in some final 
order, such as a judgment, order, or settlement.26  The provision 
provides, in relevant part, that any debt 
(19) that— 
(a) is for— 
(i) the violation of any of the Federal securities 
laws (as that term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any of the 
State securities laws, or any regulation or order 
issued under such Federal or State securities 
laws . . . and 
(b) results, before, on or after the date from which the 
petition was filed, from— 
(i) any judgment, order, consent order, or decree 
entered in any Federal or State judicial or 
administrative proceeding; 
(ii) any settlement agreement entered into by the 
 
 21  See infra Part III.B. 
 22  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 321–22.  
 23  Id. at 322. 
 24  Id. at 322; See also supra note 1 (explaining how a fraudster can continue to 
defraud despite a regulatory agency or private litigant previously attempting to stop 
him). 
 25  See S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002) (“Current bankruptcy law may permit 
wrongdoers to discharge their obligations under court judgments or settlements 
based on securities fraud and securities laws violations.  This loophole in the law 
should be closed . . . .”). 
 26  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006). 
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debtor . . . .27 
A simple reading seems clear and evidently provides that any 
settlement agreement or judgment resolving claims of securities laws 
violations are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, and thus the 
loophole that previously existed is ostensibly closed.28  This 
interpretation is also consistent among scholars.29  A careful reading 
of the statute, however, shows that this common understanding may 
not be accurate. 
The language of the statute is vague, confusing, and perhaps 
contrary to congressional intent.  According to ordinary principles of 
statutory construction, by using the conjunction “and,” the statute 
lists elements, all of which are required to satisfy the original 
proposition.30  Further, the bankruptcy code has its own explicit rules 
of construction that states the use of the word “or” is non-exclusive so 
that the conditions can be satisfied by any one of the elements joined 
by an “or.”31  Thus, by using the word “and,” Congress may have 
consciously avoided the code’s definition of “or,” and therefore 
intentionally required that all elements be satisfied for 523(a)(19)’s 
exception to apply, thereby evidencing specific congressional intent 
to require both elements, in addition to ordinary principles of 
statutory construction.  Accordingly, the placement of “and” between 
the two elements of the statute32 seems to predicate a non-
dischargeability determination on: (1) a finding of a violation of 
securities laws that is (2) memorialized in a settlement or other final 
order. 
This understanding presents an anomaly: there must be a 
definitive violation memorialized in a settlement.  Settlements, 
however, often do not admit liability.33  “The whole point of 
 
 27  Id. (emphasis added).  
 28  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 29  See, e.g., James P. Menton, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley and the New Nondischargeable Debt: 
Drafting Tips for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlements, 8 COMM. & BUS. LIT. 9 (Winter 2007); 
Pearson, supra note 4; G. Ray Warner, Accounting Reform Law Adds Broad Securities 
Fraud Discharge Exception, AM. BANKR. INST. (Sept. 1, 2002), 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM 
/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=32493. 
 30  YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 8 (Aug. 31, 2008); see also Pueblo of Santa 
Ana v. Kelly, 932 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (D.N.M. 1996).   
 31  See 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (2006).  
 32  See § 523(a)(19).  
 33  See Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment/Summary Adjudication at 4, Mollasgo v. Tills, 419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D. 
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settlement is to avoid trials and determinations of disputed facts, and 
to resolve litigation without the need for adjudications of fault or 
responsibility.”34  Moreover, settlements that neither admit nor deny 
liability (“no-fault settlements”) are desirable to both defendants and 
plaintiffs—a defendant does not want to admit liability and thereby 
be exposed to further litigation, and plaintiffs want to save the costs 
of litigation.35  Accordingly, if a definitive violation of securities laws is 
a prerequisite to non-dischargeability, and settlements are unlikely to 
contain an admission of guilt, Congress never fully closed the 
loophole.  Unscrupulous securities dealers who enter into traditional 
settlements will still receive bankruptcy protection to the detriment 
and financial harm of their victims.36  Further, because most securities 
claims end in settlements and not judgments,37 the poorly drafted 
exception may actually accomplish nothing and provide no 
protection to investors. 
Thus, a careful reading of the statute exposes a contradiction 
between congressional intent38 and statutory language, requiring 
judges and bankruptcy and securities lawyers alike to ponder if 
Congress meant what it said or if Congress meant what it wrote.  This 
is a question of “critical importance” because the determination of 
dischargeability can cause millions of dollars to change hands.39  The 
significance of dischargeability questions is highlighted by the fact 
that they consume twenty-seven percent of bankruptcy judges’ “case-
related” time and over sixteen percent of their total “work-related” 
time.40 
Determining the correct interpretation of section 523(a)(19), 
therefore, is crucial, both because of its impact on investors and 
 
Cal. 2009) (No. 09-90054-LT), 2009 U.S. Bankr. Ct. Motions LEXIS 6255, at *7; see 
also Jean Eaglesham & Chad Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 29, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203935604577066242448635560 
.html (describing how a federal district court judge’s rejection of an SEC settlement 
that neither admits nor denies liability of the underlying charges threatens to drain 
government resources because, since their settlements will be rejected, agencies will 
be forced to go to trial).   
 34  Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment/Summary Adjudication, supra note 33, at *7. 
 35  See Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 33. 
 36  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 37  Charles M. Yablon, Essay, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private 
Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 586 (2000). 
 38  See infra Part III.B.  
 39  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 324. 
 40  Id.  
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victims of securities fraud, and because it will affect how securities 
settlements are drafted.41  The answer requires careful review of the 
legislative history and context, as well as consideration of pressing 
policy concerns.  This Comment will review the history and context of 
section 523(a)(19), as well as canons of statutory construction, and 
argue that the correct interpretation of the securities-claims 
exception renders all settlements—even if such settlements fail to 
definitively establish a violation of securities laws—non-dischargeable 
in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.  This Comment then 
considers the harsh ramifications of that interpretation, as previously 
introduced with the story of Art Vandelay, the mattress store owner.42  
To reconcile these concerns and further public policy, this Comment 
then suggests an amendment to the bankruptcy code that creates a 
distinction between debts incurred through settlements with the 
government and debts incurred through settlements with private 
creditors, and distinguishes between debts arising from fraudulent 
behavior and debts arising from mere technical violations of the 
securities laws.This Comment argues that an amendment that 
clarifies section 523(a)(19) and renders only debts arising from 
fraudulent securities violations non-dischargeable, and further 
requires private plaintiffs to prove the securities violations while 
allowing the government to rely on settlements that do not 
definitively establish violations, is consistent with congressional intent 
and public policy. 
At the time of this writing, only one case, Mollasgo v. Tills (In re 
Tills),43 has attempted to discern the correct interpretation of section 
523(a)(19) at length,44 but there, the bankruptcy court arrived at a 
 
 41  See Menton, supra note 29 (delineating specific provisions to be included in 
settlement agreements in order to ensure non-dischargeability).  
 42  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 43  419 B.R. 444 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 44  Other cases have cited to Mollasgo, but no case has provided as detailed an 
analysis of § 523(a)(19).  See Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 
1423, at * 19–21 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2012) (citing Mollasgo’s recitation of the 
legislative history behind section 523(a)(19) when dismissing the plaintiff’s 
complaint for failure establish that the money defendant owed plaintiff under a note 
was related to a cease and desist order issued by the state securities commission); 
Trimble v. Putman (In re Putman), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2117, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 
June 2, 2011) (citing Mollasgo as support for plaintiffs’ argument—which the court 
ultimately rejected—that collateral estoppel should apply to default judgments with 
regards to dischargeability determinations under section 523(a)(19)); Voss v. Pudjak 
(In re Pudjak), 462 B.R. 560, 576–79 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011) (citing Mollasgo’s use of an 
analogy to section 523(a)(11) in interpreting section 523(a)(19), as discussed infra at 
text accompanying notes 129–147, but ultimately coming to a conclusion that 
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flawed conclusion.  Accordingly, after a brief introduction about the 
widespread corporate fraud giving rise to SOX and section 
523(a)(19), Part II of this Comment will describe, in detail, the 
Mollasgo holding.  Part III will show how the Mollasgo court 
misapplied precedent, reached a holding that is inconsistent with 
other jurisdictions, and frustrated congressional intent when it 
interpreted the statute to require a definitive finding of securities 
laws violations.  This Part will conclude that the correct interpretation 
of section 523(a)(19) renders all debts arising from securities laws 
violations non-dischargeable, even if the violations are not actually 
adjudicated.  Part IV will then examine the consequences of the 
present blanket securities-claims exception to discharge, and will 
suggest an amendment to the exception, which would distinguish 
between private creditors and governmental regulators, such as the 
SEC, and restrict the section’s applicability to fraudulent violations in 
order to serve public policy.  Finally, this Comment concludes that 
such an amendment, which excepts from discharge only those debts 
that arise from fraudulent violations of the securities laws and 
requires private plaintiffs to prove the underlying allegations, is 
consistent with congressional intent and public policy. 
II. FROM ENRON TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S BANKRUPTCY COURT: 
HOW GREAT FRAUD LED TO OVERREGULATION THAT MUST BE CURED 
A. America Hastily Responds to Systemic Corporate Fraud 
The addition of section 523(a)(19) came as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, which, like most financial reforms, came about as the 
result of a major crisis.45  Sarbanes-Oxley followed Enron, one of the 
 
contradicts the holding of Mollasgo);.Wilkes v. Cancelosi (In re Cancelosi), 456 B.R. 
515, 522 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011) (citing Mollasgo for the proposition that section 
523(a)(19) has a dual requirement; namely that the debt results from a violation of 
securities laws, and that the debt be memorialized in a final order or settlement); 
Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3297, at *19 n.5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
Jan. 28, 2011). 
 45  See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT 
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 19 (2006) (citing, as other examples, the English 
Bubble Act passed during the South Sea Bubble and the U.S. federal securities laws 
passed in response to the 1929 stock market crash); see also Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1528 (2005) (“Simply put the corporate governance provisions were not a focus of 
careful deliberation by Congress.  SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under 
conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving several high-
profile corporate fraud and insolvency cases.”). 
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biggest corporate frauds ever perpetrated.46  Enron started in 1985 as 
a simple Texas pipeline company, but it quickly developed into one 
of America’s leading corporations creating new markets for energy 
trading.47  Enron deliberately used faulty, unconventional accounting 
to conceal losses, inflate potential profits, and artificially raise its 
share price.48  These tactics left shareholders unknowingly holding 
worthless stock.49  Enron shocked its shareholders, and the world, 
when it revealed the true accounting in the second quarter of 2001.50  
Enron’s announcement resulted in a sudden $618 million loss for the 
third quarter of 2001, reduced shareholder equity by $1.2 million, 
and forced the company into bankruptcy—the then-largest 
bankruptcy filed in the history of the United States.51  The extent of 
the fraud was enormous, costing the average American household 
$60,000.52  Rubbing salt in the wounds, many Enron executives who 
were aware of the fraud during its perpetration53 took advantage of a 
Texas homestead law shielding their million-dollar-mansions from 
creditors while simultaneously filing for bankruptcy.54  America was 
 
 46  While Enron was the event that called attention to corporate scandals, it was 
not the only factor leading to SOX.  In fact,  
Sarbanes-Oxley would not have been enacted if Enron had been an 
isolated event.  Enron’s bankruptcy was soon followed by the financial 
collapse of approximately a dozen large public companies where there 
was also strong evidence of reporting violations and audit failures even 
more egregious than that which occurred in Enron. 
JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 6th ed. 2009).   
 47  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 309 n.4; Lucian Murley, Note, Closing a 
Bankruptcy Loop-Hole or Impairing a Debtor’s Fresh Start? Sarbanes-Oxley Creates a New 
Exception to Discharge, 92 KY. L.J. 317, 317 (2004). 
 48  Murley, supra note 47, at 317–18. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id.; see also Steven G. Schulman, U. Seth Ottensoser & Russel D. Morris, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Impact on Civil Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws 
from the Plaintiff’s Perspective, ALI-ABA Course of Study Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Impact 
on Civil Litigation under Federal Securities Laws, Dec. 5, 2002 at 297 (281). 
 51  Schulman, Ottensoser & Morris, supra note 50, at 297.  Enron’s record 
bankruptcy was surpassed less than a year later by WorldCom’s filing for bankruptcy 
protection after its own accounting scandal was exposed.  See Simon Romero & Riva 
D. Atlas, WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-
worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html?pagewanted=all. 
 52  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 311; Murley, supra note 47, at 318.  
 53  See Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 309 n.4. 
 54  Nelson S. Ebaugh, The Securities Claim Exemption in Bankruptcy: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, 19 SEC. LITIG. J. (2008), available at 
http://www.ebaughlaw.com/uploads/1/1/9/4/11948411/securities_claim 
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outraged; Congress needed to act.55 
Congress responded with Sarbanes-Oxley.56  SOX is a 
comprehensive piece of legislation “intended to rein in corporate 
executives run amok and restore investor confidence” in corporate 
America.57  Many embraced it as the answer to corporate greed.  For 
example, President Bush, when he signed it into law, praised the act, 
remarking that it was one of the “the most far reaching reforms of 
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.”58  Harvey Pitt, then SEC Chairman, described the law as 
assurance that “abuses of the system are not, and will not be allowed 
to become, the norm in American business.”59 
But SOX, arguably, was nothing more than an emotionally 
driven, knee-jerk reaction to Enron,60 much like most readers’ initial 
reaction to the opening story of this Comment.61  Like many initial 
emotional reactions, SOX was not appropriately formulated.62  SOX 
was introduced to Congress a mere six weeks after the release of the 
Board of Directors’ Official Report on Enron.63  Despite its obvious 
quick drafting, there was little Congressional debate over the bill.64  
Hardly any Member of the House spoke on any of the bill’s major 
proposals.65  Some commentators claim that the Senate only heard 
from biased witnesses who did not present any evidence on balancing 
costs and benefits.66  Rather, the Senate swiftly passed the legislation.67  
“Simply put, the corporate governance provisions were not a focus of 
 
_exemption_in_bankruptcy.pdf.  
 55  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 19. 
 56  See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 57  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 310.   
 58  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 9. 
 59  Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Chairman, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the 
American Bar Association Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm.  
 60  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 19 (calling the Act “just one example 
of the ‘Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome’”). 
 61  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 62  See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 7. (“Congress knew very little when it 
acted precipitously, in the midst of a regulatory panic” and “Congress acted 
precipitously, without anything resembling a balanced consideration of the issues.”). 
 63  Keith N. Sambur, Note, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Effect on Section 523 of the 
Bankruptcy Code: Are All Securities Laws Debts Really Nondischargeable?, 11 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 561, 561 (2003).  
 64  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45, at 20. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
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careful deliberation by Congress.  SOX was emergency legislation, 
enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a 
media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and 
insolvency cases.”68  Due to the deficient procedure in the bill’s 
passing, it is understandable that the final product has many 
imperfections.69  One such imperfection is the vague language of the 
securities-claims exception to discharge in bankruptcy.70 
B. Mollasgo Unraveled 
The only court to squarely attempt to interpret the vague 
language of section 523(a)(19) is the Mollasgo court.71  The facts of 
the case are as follows: A creditor lost money in a real estate 
investment when the debtor allegedly violated state securities laws 
and perpetrated a fraud.72  The parties entered into a no-fault 
settlement agreement, in which neither party admitted fault nor 
liability.73  During the course of settlement negotiations, the debtor 
expressed intentions to file for bankruptcy after signing the 
settlement.74  The debtor made no payments of the settlement and 
voluntarily filed for bankruptcy about a month after settling the 
claims.75  The creditor initiated a judicial proceeding to deem the 
debt non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19) and moved for 
summary judgment.76 
The court denied summary judgment, holding that the plain 
language of the statute77 required an established violation of 
securities laws in order to render the settlement non-dischargeable.78  
According to the court, the settlement in question, by expressly not 
admitting liability, failed to satisfy this element.79  To support this 
contention, the court examined the legislative history and concluded 
that Congress’s intent was to prevent established wrongdoers from 
manipulating the bankruptcy code to shield themselves from 
 
 68  Romano, supra note 45, at 1528. 
 69  See generally BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 45. 
 70  See supra notes 30–39 and accompanying text.  
 71  But see sources cited supra note 44. 
 72  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).  
 73  Id.  
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 448–49.  
 76  Id. at 449.  
 77  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 78  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 451. 
 79  Id. 
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investor-litigants.80 
The court reasoned that without a definitive establishment of a 
violation, there is no wrongdoer.81  In reaching this conclusion, the 
Mollasgo court relied heavily on the purported stated purpose of the 
statute, which is to “make judgments and settlements arising from 
state and federal securities law violations brought by state and federal 
regulators and private individuals non-dischargeable.  Current 
bankruptcy law may permit wrongdoers to discharge their obligations 
under court judgments or settlements based on securities fraud and 
securities law violations.”82  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
“[t]he [Senate] Report focuses on resolved securities violations, 
rather than on settled claims of violations.”83  The court further 
stated, “the Report and the Act’s author support the conclusion that 
section 523(a)(19) is intended to target securities laws violators, not to 
generally penalize all debtors who settle allegations of securities 
violations.”84  Since the statute only exempts from discharge 
wrongdoers’ settlements, the court reasoned that because the creditor 
in the instant case failed to obtain an admission of liability, the 
settlement could not benefit from the protection offered by section 
523(a)(19).85  The court conceded that Congress intended to give 
settlements preclusive effect, but reasoned that preclusive effect 
could not be granted to the settlement at issue because the 
agreement expressly failed to resolve the question of liability.86  The 
court therefore concluded “that Congress provided plaintiffs with a 
valuable tool in securities litigation, but also allowed the parties to 
avoid de facto non-dischargeability through settlement agreement 
language that expressly avoids any concession of fault or liability.”87 
The court claimed that Supreme Court jurisprudence supported 
its conclusions.88  Mollasgo relied on Archer v. Warner, which held that 
settlement agreements do not create a novation, and bankruptcy 
courts should instead look to the circumstances that gave rise to the 
settlement to determine if it arose from conduct that would render 
 
 80  Id. at 452. 
 81  Id.  
 82  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002)). 
 83  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002)). 
 84  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 452.  
 85  Id. at 453. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 454.  
 88  Id. 
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the debt non-dischargeable.89  Archer dealt with a claim brought under 
section 523(a)(2), which excepts from discharge claims that arise out 
of fraud.90  Mollasgo applied Archer’s ruling and, without determining 
the factual question of liability, held that the settlement was not 
automatically non-dischargeable.91  The Mollasgo court therefore 
denied the creditor’s summary judgment motion.92 
The Mallasgo court also looked to persuasive authority 
interpreting section 523(a)(11).93  Section 523(a)(11) excepts from 
discharge those debts that stem from “any final judgment, 
unreviewable order, or consent order . . . or contained in any settlement 
agreement entered into by the debtor, arising from any act of fraud or 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity . . . with respect to any 
depository institution or insured credit union.”94  The Mallasgo court 
therefore looked to Meyer v. Ridgon,95 a case dealing with a section 
523(a)(11) settlement, and found further support for the denial of 
summary judgment in the case before it.96  In its reasoning, Mollasgo 
cited to a hypothetical that the Meyer court created to illustrate the 
power of section 523(a)(11).97  The hypothetical illustrated a scenario 
that would render a settlement non-dischargeable when the debtor 
admitted liability.98  Because the hypothetical only dealt with a 
settlement where the debtor admitted liability, the Mollasgo court 
reasoned that the Meyer court would have reached a different holding 
if the settlement did not admit liability.99  The Mollasgo court also 
supported its conclusions by pointing out that the Meyer court 
“looked behind the default judgment” to determine if the underlying 
facts supported a finding of non-dischargeability.100  The Mollasgo 
court therefore concluded that the interpretation of the similar 
language in section 523(a)(11) mandates that section 523(a)(19) 
does not render settlements automatically dischargeable if they fail to 
expressly admit liability, and rather that courts should carefully 
 
 89  538 U.S. 314, 322–23 (2003). 
 90  Id.  
 91  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454 (citing Archer, 538 U.S. at 323).  
 92  See id. 
 93  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(11) (2006). 
 94  Id. (emphasis added). 
 95  36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 96  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456 (citing Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380). 
 97  Id. 
 98  Meyer, 36 F.3d. at 1379.   
 99  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456.  
 100  Id.  
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examine such settlements to ensure that a securities law violation 
actually occurred.101 
The Mollasgo court then distinguished relevant case law that 
seemingly supported the creditor’s argument that the settlement 
should be excepted from discharge.  The court distinguished 
Peterman v. Whitcomb (In re Whitcomb),102 a case that held a no-fault 
settlement to be non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19), on the 
basis that the debtor in Whitcomb agreed that he damaged the 
creditor.103  The court also distinguished Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re 
Buzzeo), a case holding a similar no-fault settlement non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(19), on the basis that the 
settlement agreement included a waiver by the debtor of his right to 
discharge the debt in bankruptcy.104 
Policy considerations also influenced the Mollasgo court. First, 
the court noted that, generally, settlements are to be encouraged as 
an amicable resolution of disputes.105  The court then reasoned that 
rendering all settlements of securities claims non-dischargeable, even 
those that do not establish liability, would discourage settlements.106  
The court was also concerned about denying innocent and honest 
debtors their fresh start,107 which a blanket exception to discharge of 
all settlements of securities violations would inevitably do, as 
demonstrated by Vandelay’s story at the beginning of this 
Comment.108  The court recognized that automatically rendering all 
securities claims settlements non-dischargeable will prevent innocent 
debtors from even pleading their case.109  Such a result is contrary to 
the fundamental bankruptcy principal of the fresh start.110  In short, 
the very same issues that intuitively perturb the reader of the second 
hypothetical at the beginning of this Comment bothered the court.111 
The Mollasgo court put forth well-articulated reasons for 
concluding that section 523(a)(19) requires a definitive finding of a 
 
 101  Id.  
 102  303 B.R. 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 103  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456 (citing Whitcomb, 303 B.R. at 808).  
 104  Id. at 456–57 (citing Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578, 580–81 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007)).  
 105  Id. at 454. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 454–55. 
 108  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 109  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454–55.  
 110  See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text. 
 111  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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securities law violation.  The court’s reasoning, however, is flawed.  A 
careful analysis reveals that the Mollasgo court arrived at its conclusion 
by misapplying precedent and improperly distinguishing germane 
persuasive authority.112  Further, the Mollasgo holding is contrary to 
congressional intent, which supports a conclusion that all settlements 
of securities laws violations are automatically non-dischargeable, 
regardless of the absence of an adjudication of liability.113  Thus, while 
the court raised some valid policy concerns, it improperly interpreted 
section 523(a)(19). 
III: EXAMINING MOLLASGO AND DETERMINING THE TRUE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SECURITIES CLAIM EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE 
The reasoning in Mollasgo is based on misapplications of 
precedent, and the court’s holding conflicts with congressional intent 
and the holdings of other jurisdictions.114  Mollasgo’s interpretation of 
section 523(a)(19) is therefore incorrect, and further analysis is 
required to solve the question of dischargeability in securities claims.  
This Part will first refute the Mollasgo court’s reasoning and then 
examine congressional intent to arrive at the correct interpretation of 
section 523(a)(19), namely that the section provides an automatic 
exception from discharge to all settlements of securities laws 
violations, even if the settlement does not resolve the question of 
liability, such as no-fault settlements. 
A. Refuting Mollasgo 
The holding in Mollasgo is faulty because it roots itself in a 
misapplication of precedent.  Mollasgo relies on Archer v. Warner, 
which held that settlement agreements do not create an absolute 
novation (replacing the original debt with a new one, which in theory 
would be unconnected to the fraud and thus not excepted from 
discharge), but rather that bankruptcy courts should look to the 
circumstances that gave rise to the settlement to determine if the 
settlement arises from conduct that would render the debt non-
dischargeable.115 
In Archer, the plaintiff-creditor sued the defendant-debtor for 
money allegedly obtained through fraud.116  The parties settled the 
 
 112  See infra Part III.A. 
 113  See infra Part III.B. 
 114  See infra Part III.B.  
 115  Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 323 (2003). 
 116  Id. at 316–17. 
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suit, releasing all claims, but the settlement agreement did not 
resolve the question of liability.117  The defendant-debtor 
subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiff-creditor claimed 
that the settlement debt was non-dischargeable since it was for money 
obtained by fraud,118 which is a type of non-dischargeable debt 
pursuant to section 523(a)(2).119  Defendant-debtor claimed that the 
settlement agreement created a novation, that is the defendant-
debtor claimed that the settlement debt was the result of the 
bargaining between the two parties and not a debt for money 
obtained through fraud.120  The Court held for the plaintiff-creditor, 
reasoning that the settlement did not create a total novation,121 and if 
the bankruptcy court determined that the defendant-debtor had 
defrauded plaintiff-creditor, the settlement agreement would be non-
dischargeable.122  Mollasgo applied this principle to hold that 
settlements that fail to resolve liability are not automatically 
dischargeable under section 523(a)(19), but rather the bankruptcy 
court must make a liability determination.123 
Archer, however, is inapplicable to section 523(a)(19) cases.  In 
Archer, the settlement at issue resolved claims of fraud, the debt of 
which is non-dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2), which does 
not mention settlement agreements.124  The Archer court recognized 
that allowing fraudulent debtors to escape their burden through 
bankruptcy is unsound, and thus charged bankruptcy courts to look 
past the settlement agreement to determine dischargeability.125  
Subsequently, many courts have looked behind settlement 
agreements when determining dischargeability for section 523(a)(2) 
cases, and other similar claims.126  Cases brought under section 
 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006). 
 120  Archer, 538 U.S. at 318. 
 121  Id. at 323. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 453 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009).  
 124  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006). 
 125  Archer, 538 U.S. at 323 (“We conclude that the Archers’ settlement agreement 
and releases may have worked a kind of novation, but that fact does not bar the 
Archers from showing that the settlement debt arose out of ‘false pretenses, a false 
representation, or actual fraud,’ and consequently is nondischargeable.”) (quoting § 
523(a)(2)(A)). 
 126  See, e.g., Giamo v. DeTrano (In re DeTrano), 326 F.3d 319, 322–23 (2d Cir. 
2003) (stating that “a debt incurred pursuant to a settlement agreement is 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy if the agreement settled claims that, if proven, 
would have created a nondischargeable debt,” and  further stating that, “[i]f the 
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523(a)(19), however, should not be subject to the same analysis as 
fraud cases that fall under section 523(a)(2).  Congress intentionally 
used the phrase “settlement agreements” in section 523(a)(19)(B), 
thus granting them preclusive effect without being subject to Archer’s 
judicially created doctrine.127  Archer, therefore, is inapplicable to 
section 523(a)(19) dischargeability claims, and it was improper for 
the Mollasgo court to rely on it. 
The Mollasgo court further misapplied relevant case law in its 
reliance on Meyer v. Ridgon.128  Unlike section 523(a)(2), section 
523(a)(11) is helpful in determining the nature of the preclusive 
effect granted to settlements under section 523(a)(19) since section 
523(a)(11) excepts from discharge all debts arising from the 
fraudulent actions committed by persons acting in a fiduciary 
capacity to a bank, including such debts “contained in a settlement 
agreement.”129 The Mollasgo court recognized this and properly 
looked to a case discussing section 523(a)(11)’s application to 
settlements, Meyer v. Ridgon, but the Mollasgo court attributed an 
erroneous holding to Meyer.130 
In Meyer, the defendant was the president of a bank and was sued 
for breaching his fiduciary duties.131  The court entered a default 
judgment against him for failing to answer the complaint.132  The 
defendant then filed for bankruptcy and the plaintiff-creditors 
petitioned the court to determine that the debt was non-
dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(11).133  In its holding, the 
Meyer court stated: 
The plain language of section 523(a)(11) . . . alters the 
common law collateral estoppel rules with respect to default 
judgments, settlement agreements, and certain 
administrative agency decisions. . . . [It] requires the 
bankruptcy court to give preclusive effect to . . . non-court 
approved settlement agreements, that would not be given 
 
bankruptcy court determines that the debt DeTrano owes pursuant to the settlement 
agreement ‘arises out of’ fraud, that debt must be excepted from discharge”). 
 127  It should be noted that Hodges v. Buzzeo (In re Buzzeo), 365 B.R. 578 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2007), discussed infra text accompanying notes 155–159, applies Archer to a 
case brought under § 523(a)(19), but presumably because the debtor raised the very 
novation argument that Archer precludes.   
 128  See supra notes 93–102 and accompanying text. 
 129  § 523(a)(11).  
 130  See Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 131  Meyer v. Ridgon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1377 (7th Cir. 1994).  
 132  Id. 
 133  Id.  
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preclusive effect under the common law.  Therefore, we 
must conclude that Congress intended to preempt the 
common law by enacting section 523(a)(11).134 
The Meyer court further stated that a bankruptcy court is prohibited 
from requiring further evidence to determine the dischargeability of 
debts arising from the settlements or final orders specified in section 
523(a)(11);135 bankruptcy courts must give such settlements and 
orders an automatic preclusive effect.136 
Thus, the Mollasgo court interpreted Meyer incorrectly, and Meyer 
actually supports the proposition that settlements that do not 
establish liability are nevertheless excepted from discharge under 
section 523(a)(19).  Despite Meyer’s holding that section 523(a)(11) 
grants all settlements and default judgments—which by definition do 
not determine liability—preclusive effect in subsequent 
dischargeability proceedings,137 the Mollasgo court used Meyer as 
support for holding that a liability determination is necessary.138  
Mollasgo pointed to the fact that the Meyer court looked behind the 
default judgment to determine if the complaint alleged fraudulent 
conduct that would render the debt non-dischargeable.139  The Meyer 
court, however, looked behind the default judgment to the complaint 
because the court was reviewing the case de novo,140 and the 
defendant-debtor argued that the original suit was not for conduct 
that would render the debt non-dischargeable.141  The court did not 
look behind the default judgment because it was required to in order 
to determine dischargeability.  Conversely, in Mollasgo both parties 
agreed that the underlying claims, if true, would render the debt 
non-dischargeable under section 523(a)(19).142  Thus, Mollasgo 
improperly relied on Meyer, which held that all settlements and 
orders, regardless of the absence of a liability determination, are non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(11).143 
Further, a proper reading of Meyer supports a conclusion that all 
settlements for securities claims are automatically non-dischargeable, 
 
 134  Id. at 1380 (emphasis added).  
 135  Id. at 1381. 
 136  Id.   
 137  See supra text accompanying notes 130–136.   
 138  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 139  Id.; see also Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1382–85. 
 140  Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1378.  
 141  Id. at 1382. 
 142  See generally Mollasgo, 419 B.R. 444. 
 143  Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380. 
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regardless of a definitive finding of liability.  As Mollasgo notes, “cases 
involving section 523(a)(11) and settlement agreements offer insight 
into the proper analysis of section 523(a)(19).”144  Analysis of section 
523(a)(11) is relevant because “identical words used in different parts 
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”145  Since 
Congress gave preclusive effect to settlements under section 
523(a)(11),146 it is apparent that Congress also intended to grant all 
settlements preclusive effect under section 523(a)(19) so that 
“regulators will now be able to prosecute these con artists with the 
needed confidence that the victories won in enforcement 
proceedings will not be nullified in bankruptcy proceedings.”147  
Accordingly, just as bankruptcy courts do not need to any additional 
evidence to determine the non-dischargeability of settlements under 
section 523(a)(11),148 settlements for securities laws violations are also 
granted automatic preclusive effect by section 523(a)(19), regardless 
of a definitive finding of liability. 
The Mollasgo court also inappropriately distinguished Peterman v. 
Whitcomb (In re Whitcomb)149 when reaching its holding, and Mollasgo’s 
holding is therefore not in harmony with its sister jurisdiction’s 
interpretation of section 523(a)(19).  In Whitcomb, the plaintiffs sued 
the defendant for fraud in connection with the sale of securities.150  
The parties settled the suit with the defendant admitting liability.151  
The plaintiff-creditors then sought a judicial determination that the 
settlement was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to section 
 
 144  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 455.  
 145  Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 146  See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 147  Meyer, 36 F.3d at 1380 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. H13288, 13289 (daily ed. Oct. 
27, 1990) (statement of Rep. Brooks)).  Note that this statement is from the 
legislative history of the enactment of § 523(a)(11) and supports the conclusion that 
Congress used the same terms in sections 523(a)(11) and (a)(19) in order to give 
preclusive effect to settlements under both sections.  See infra Part III.B for a lengthy 
discussion of similar Congressional statements in the history of § 523(a)(19).  
Similarly, the court in Voss v. Pujdak (In re Pujdak), used this reasoning to hold that a 
default judgment has preclusive effect, without looking behind the judgment, in 
dischargeability determinations under § 523(a)(19).  462 B.R. 560, 576–79 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2011).  But see Trimble v. Putman (In re Putman), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2117, at 
*7 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. June 2, 2011) (refusing to apply collateral estoppel principles to 
a default judgment in a dischargeability determination under § 523(a)(19)).   
 148  See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 149  303 B.R. 806 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 150  Id. at 807. 
 151  Id. at 807–08. 
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523(a)(19) and the court deemed the debt non-dischargeable.152  The 
Mollasgo court distinguished Whitcomb on the basis that the defendant 
admitted to harming the plaintiff-creditors.153  The Whitcomb court, 
however, noted while judging on the pleadings that the first element 
of section 523(a)(19), a violation, was proven because the 
“[c]omplaint alleged that the debt results from fraud . . . .”154  Thus, 
the Whitcomb court indicated that an allegation that a debt results from 
securities fraud is sufficient to meet the first requirement of section 
523(a)(19), a violation, and render a debt non-dischargeable, even 
absent an admission to the allegations.  Accordingly, Mollasgo’s 
holding is not in accord with the Northern District of Illinois’s 
apparent interpretation of section 523(a)(19). 
The Mollasgo court also wrongly distinguished Hodges v. Buzzeo 
(In re Buzzeo).155  In Buzzeo the plaintiffs sued the defendant for the 
fraudulent sale of securities in violation of state securities laws.156  The 
parties entered into a settlement agreement that failed to resolve 
liability, but the defendant waived his right to dischargeability.157  
Based on this waiver, the Mollasgo court distinguished Buzzeo’s 
holding that the settlement was not dischargeable pursuant to section 
523(a)(19).158  The Buzzeo decision, however, could not have turned 
on the dischargeability waiver since a waiver of dischargeability prior 
to petitioning for bankruptcy is unenforceable as against public 
policy.159  Accordingly, Buzzeo must have granted summary judgment 
to the creditor because the settlement agreement is simply not 
 
 152  Id. at 807. 
 153  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 456 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 154  Whitcomb, 303 B.R. at 810 (emphasis added). 
 155  365 B.R. 578 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007); see also Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456. 
 156  Buzzeo, 365 B.R. at 580. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 456–57 (citing Buzzeo, 365 B.R. at 580–81).  In re Schwartz 
erroneously made the same distinction when denying summary judgment in similar 
circumstances to those of Mollasgo.  Star High Yield Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Schwartz (In 
re Schwartz), No. 07-30508, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3594 at *12 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 
17, 2007).  In Schwartz, the court was concerned with the debtor’s summary judgment 
motion, in which defendant-debtor argued a novation theory that Archer precluded.  
Id.  Nevertheless, Schwartz, in passing, distinguished Buzzeo because of the waiver 
when denying creditor’s cross motion for summary judgment.  Id.   
 159  11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2006) (“A discharge in a case under this title . . . 
operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an 
action . . . whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.”); Cheripka v. Republic 
Ins. Co (In re Cheripka), No. 91-3249, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30343 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 
1991), aff’d en banc by an equally divided court, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38449 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 24, 1992).  
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dischargeable since section 523(a)(19) renders all settlements of 
securities violations non-dischargeable, regardless of whether or not 
liability is established.  Thus, Mollasgo’s holding is also not aligned 
with the Western District of Pennsylvania’s evident interpretation of 
section 523(a)(19). 
In addition to misinterpreting the above cases, the Mollasgo 
court is apparently not in accord with other jurisdictions, as well.  In 
Faris v. Bahram Amir Jafari (In re Beharm Amir Jafari) the defendant 
allegedly defrauded the plaintiff-investors in connection with the sale 
of securities, in violation of securities laws.160  The plaintiffs took no 
other action besides seeking a judicial determination of non-
dischargeability for a debt that the defendant had yet to incur.161  The 
court therefore denied the plaintiff-creditors’ summary judgment 
motion to determine the debt non-dischargeable under section 
523(a)(19) because at the time of the hearing “[p]laintiffs had not 
yet filed an action in another forum to obtain an order, judgment or 
decree, holding the Debtor liable for securities violations or securities 
fraud.  Nor [had] they entered into a settlement agreement with the Debtor 
resolving a claim for securities violations or securities fraud.”162  Thus, the 
Faris court seemingly held that a settlement agreement could satisfy 
the requirements of section 523(a)(19) without any further 
determination of liability.163 
Additionally, Frost v. Civiello (In re Civiello) supports a conclusion 
inapposite of Mollasgo’s.164  In Civiello, the defendant sold non-
registered securities in violation of state securities laws.165  The Ohio 
Division of Securities, the institution responsible for enforcing Ohio 
Securities Laws,166 issued defendant a Cease and Desist Order.167  The 
Cease and Desist Order did not determine liability, nor was there any 
 
 160  401 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009). 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
 163  An ambiguous statement appears later in the opinion that could be read to 
contradict the court’s earlier reasoning.  See 401 B.R. at 499 (“Thus, the Court 
concludes that, absent a settlement agreement or other consensual determination of 
liability, Subsection B evidences a conscious choice to have the liability determination 
occur outside the bankruptcy forum . . . .”).  This statement can be explained, 
however, since the plaintiff-creditor was asking the court to determine liability and 
render a debt non-dischargeable. 
 164  348 B.R. 459 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 165  Id. at 461. 
 166  Id. at 464. 
 167  Id. 
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adjudicatory hearing.168  The court held that the Cease and Desist 
Order, which did not determine liability, was sufficient to satisfy the 
violation of section 523(a)(19).169 
Nace v. Quibell (In re Quibell) also supports the argument that a 
Cease and Desist letter is sufficient to establish the “violation” 
requirement of section 523(a)(19).170  In Quibell, the Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission issued a Cease and Desist letter to a company, 
which the defendant-debtor promoted as an investment to the 
plaintiff, for violations of state securities laws.171  The defendant-
debtor owed the plaintiff money on a note that the defendant-debtor 
gave the plaintiff “for reasons that [were] unclear on the record,” but 
apparently related to the company that received a Cease and Desist 
Order.172  The court denied summary judgment for the plaintiff on 
the issue of dischargeability of the note under section 523(a)(19), 
because the plaintiff “failed to establish a nexus between the Cease 
and Desist Order and the judgment note,”173 and thus could not 
establish that the debt was for a violation of securities laws.174  This 
reasoning suggests that had the plaintiff established the nexus, the 
Cease and Desist Order would have been sufficient to establish a 
violation of securities laws for purposes of dischargeability under 
section 523(a)(19),175 and thus Mollasgo’s requirement of an 
affirmative establishment of liability is not in accord.  The above cases 
suggest that other jurisdictions do not interpret section 523(a)(19) as 
Mollasgo does, but rather they hold that settlements that do not 
resolve liability are nevertheless non-dischargeable under section 
523(a)(19). 
 
 168  Id. at 462. 
 169  Id. at 465–66. 
 170  See 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1423 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2012). 
 171  Id. at *6. 
 172  Id. at *19. 
 173  Id. at *19–20. 
 174  Id. at *20. 
 175  Other language in the opinion may suggest that a Cease and Desist order is 
not sufficient to establish the requisite violation of securities laws for the purposes of 
section 523(a)(19).  Id. at *18 (“But even if the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order 
establishes that a violation of Pennsylvania Securities Laws occurred,” the debt would 
still be dischargeable since the plaintiff could not establish a connection between the 
defendant and the Cease and Desist order (emphasis added)).  But see Nace v. 
Quibell (In re Quibell), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1423, at * 19–21 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 
2012) (stating, when dismissing the complaint, that had the plaintiff established a 
nexus between the defendant-debtor and the Cease and Desist Order, a violation of 
securities laws would have been established for the purposes of section 523(a)(19)).   
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B. Mollasgo is Contrary to Congress’s Intent that All Settlements for 
Securities Violations be Non-Dischargeable 
The legislative history indicates that the Mollasgo holding is 
contrary to the true intent of the statute.  As one commentator noted, 
“[t]he legislative intent behind § 523(a)(19) is quite clear; it was 
added to protect investors.”176  In adding the securities-claims 
exception to discharge, Congress sought to close a loophole that 
allowed fraudsters to use the bankruptcy code to avoid debts for their 
wrongdoing.177  As the section-by-section analysis states: 
Under current laws, state regulators are often forced to 
“reprove” their fraud cases in bankruptcy court to prevent 
discharge because remedial statutes often have different 
technical elements than the analogous common law causes 
of action.  Moreover, settlements may not have the same collateral 
estoppel effect as judgments obtained through fully litigated legal 
proceedings.  In short, with their resources already stretched 
to the breaking point, state regulators must plow the same 
ground twice in securities fraud cases.  By ensuring 
securities law judgments and settlements in state cases are 
non-dischargeable, precious state enforcement resources 
will be preserved and directed at preventing fraud in the 
first place.178 
The record further states that the section 
make[s] judgments and settlements arising from state and 
federal law violations brought by state and federal 
regulators and private individuals non-dischargeable.  
Current bankruptcy law may permit wrongdoers to 
discharge their obligations under court judgments or 
settlements based on securities fraud and securities law 
violations.  This loophole in the law should be closed . . . .179 
Thus the section-by-section analysis makes clear that the statute is 
intended to give all settlements relating to securities laws violations a 
collateral estoppel effect that they would normally not receive.180 
The section-by-section analysis is authoritative because courts 
frequently rely on section-by-section analyses when discerning the 
legislature’s intent.181  Additionally, the section-by-section analysis 
 
 176  Pierre-Louis, supra note 2, at 329–30 (internal quotations omitted). 
 177  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
 178  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (emphasis added).  
 179  Id. 
 180  See id.  
 181  See, e.g., Smith v. Gibbons (In re Gibbons), 289 B.R. 588, 594 (2003) (giving 
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explicitly states that the analysis is intended “to provide guidance in 
the legal interpretation of these provisions.”182  Further, Congress 
previously granted settlements preclusive effect in section 
523(a)(11).183  Congress is aware of the terms it uses in other sections 
and their effect on new sections if used again.184  Accordingly, 
Congress intended to give settlements under section 523(a)(19) the 
same preclusive effect they are afforded under section 523(a)(11).  
Mollasgo, therefore, was in error by stating that Congress “focuse[d] 
on resolved securities violations, rather than on settled claims of 
securities violations.”185  Interpreting the statute to require 
settlements to be accompanied by litigated findings of liability is 
illogical since parties enter into settlement agreements as a way to 
avoid litigation, and thus settlement agreements will rarely present 
actual findings.186  Such an interpretation would render the statutory 
phrase “any settlement agreement” meaningless.187 
Canons of statutory construction also support the conclusion 
that all securities claims settlements, regardless of liability 
determinations, are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Mollasgo based 
its theory on the vague statutory language and the statute’s use of the 
word “and,” which seemingly requires the presence of all enumerated 
elements for the dischargability exception to apply.188  But “and” does 
not always mean “and”; it can sometimes mean “or.”189  When “a strict 
grammatical construction will frustrate evident legislative intent, a 
court may read ‘and’ as ‘or’ . . . .”190  This is especially true when 
Congress rushes complex legislation through both houses,191 as was 
 
“substantial weight” to the section-by-section analysis behind section 523(a)(19)). 
 182  148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  
 183  See supra text accompanying notes 129–147. 
 184  Sambur, supra note 63, at 571; see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 
(1978) (“Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the 
interpretation” of prior terms “at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”); United 
States v. Palozie, 166 F.3d 502, 504–05 (2d. Cir. 1999) (stating that when Congress 
enacts a new law using identical language that has already been interpreted by the 
courts, it is presumed that Congress intended the interpreted meaning).  
 185  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 452 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 186  See Halpern v. First Ga. Bank (In re Halpern), 810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 
1987); Hutchens v. Temples (In re Temples), No. 05-9134, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3174 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2006).  
 187  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19) (2006).  
 188  See supra text accompanying notes 77–80 and 30–37. 
 189  KIM, supra note 30, at 8. 
 190  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 191  See id.; DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“[T]he word ‘or’ is 
often used as a careless substitute for the word ‘and.’”). 
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the case with SOX.192  Further, statutes should always be construed in 
a way that does not render any part superfluous.193  But if Mollasgo’s 
holding is correct, then the statute is superfluous.  Simply put, if a 
definitive violation of securities laws was always required then there 
would never be a chance for settlements, which do not determine 
liability, to be deemed non-dischargeable.194 
Lastly, Mollasgo’s holding is detrimental to public policy goals, at 
least when it is applied to government agencies.  The Mollasgo court 
reasoned that rendering all securities litigation settlements non-
dischargeable would discourage debtors from entering into 
settlement agreements and thereby open the floodgates to 
litigation.195  Although this argument has some merit, it ignores the 
fact that subjecting settlements to litigation in bankruptcy court will 
discourage plaintiffs from settling claims.  Since the purpose of the 
statute was to preserve “precious state enforcement resources” and 
save regulators from having to “plow the same ground twice,” it seems 
that Congress intended to encourage governmental plaintiffs to 
settle.196  Thus, making settlements unattractive to government-
plaintiffs appears irrational.  Indeed, the government’s need to save 
its resources is at the crux of a current debate over a federal judge’s 
rejection of an SEC settlement with a defendant-bank that neither 
admitted nor denied liability.197  It is undeniable that automatically 
rendering securities settlements non-dischargeable is unfair to some 
factually innocent but prosecuted debtors, but that result is the 
 
 192  See supra text accompanying notes 60–70. 
 193  KIM, supra note 30, at 12; see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 
501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991).  
 194  See Reply Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment/Summary Adjudication, supra note 33, at *7.  
 195  Mollasgo v. Tills (In re Tills), 419 B.R. 444, 454 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2009). 
 196  S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002).   
 197  See Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 33; Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup 
Settlement With SEC, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-accord-with-
citi.html?pagewanted=all (“The [SEC] . . . must settle most of the cases it brings 
because it does not have the money or the staff to battle deep-pocketed Wall Street 
firms in court. Wall Street firms will rarely admit wrongdoing, the agency says, 
because that can be used against them in investor lawsuits.”); Jake Zamansky, Rakoff 
Rejection of Citi / SEC Settlement Pierces Wall Street’s Alice-in-Wonderland Thinking, FORBES 
(Nov. 29, 2011, 2:44 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jakezamansky/2011/11/29/rakoff-rejection-of-citi-sec-
settlement-pierces-wall-streets-alice-in-wonderland-thinking/ (arguing that rejection 
of no-fault settlements is proper because it disallows companies to write off fraud as a 
cost of business and prevents the SEC from obtaining “wrist-slap” settlements for 
conduct that is not actually a violation of the law).   
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conscious decision of the legislature.  Innocent debtors can avoid 
non-dischargeability by refusing to settle and pursuing litigation. 
After examining the legislative record, it is apparent that 
Congress intended to grant preclusive effect to securities-claims 
settlements that do not establish liability.  Further, principles of 
statutory construction validate this interpretation.  Mollasgo’s 
argument to the contrary is ill founded, as it is based on misapplied 
precedent and is inconsistent with other jurisdictions’ 
interpretations.  Rather, the correct interpretation of section 
523(a)(19) renders all securities claims settlements non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy; even those that fail to establish liability 
for securities violations.  We are thus faced with the policy dilemma 
posited in the beginning of this Comment. 
IV. POLICY CONCERNS DICTATE A NECESSARY AMENDMENT TO 
SECTION 523(A)(19) 
Congress may have intended that section 523(a)(19) except 
from discharge all settlements related to securities violations, but the 
question remains if that action serves public policy.  As Mollasgo 
noted, section 523(a)(19) seriously hampers the longstanding, 
fundamental “fresh start” goal of bankruptcy.198  The ramifications are 
highlighted by Art Vandelay’s story, presented in this Comment’s 
introduction.199 
The scope of section 523(a)(19) reaches beyond what Congress 
sought to address.200  For example, while the enactment was in 
response to corporate scandals, the section’s applicability is not so 
limited and applies even to small privately held securities of 
companies that are not publicly traded.201  Further, there are 
numerous technical violations of securities laws that a debtor could 
inadvertently violate without any fraudulent intent.202  Given 
Congress’s intent to curb corporate fraud, it seems wrong to punish 
securities violators that acted without any scienter or fraudulent 
intent.203  Additionally, section 523(a)(19) only applies to individual 
debtors, and not corporations.204  Thus, individuals will feel the full 
 
 198  Mollasgo, 419 B.R. at 454–55. 
 199  See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 200  See supra Part III.B. 
 201  Warner, supra note 29, at 44.  
 202  Id.; Pearson, supra note 4.  
 203  See supra Part III.B.  
 204  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2006) (“A discharge under [the various bankruptcy 
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force of Congress’s reactionary regulatory force aimed at fraudulent 
corporations like Enron, which are outside the scope of the discharge 
exception.205 
The securities-claim exception also gives a windfall to private 
litigants.  Most securities fraud cases are brought by private litigants 
and resemble ordinary tort claims.206  Additionally, most securities 
claims settle for amounts dramatically smaller than the plaintiffs’ 
original demands.207  The reason such cases settle is because securities 
defendants are risk-averse, pessimistic, and unwilling to expose 
themselves to further liability.208  Therefore, the fact that a case settles 
does not reflect that the underlying claims were meritorious.  Section 
523(a)(19) gives these private plaintiffs a windfall by exempting their 
settlements from discharge in bankruptcy even though it is possible, 
if not probable, that liability would never have been established if the 
claims were actually litigated.  This exemption thus gives plaintiffs 
tremendous bargaining power at the settlement table209 by allowing 
them to extract settlements of dubious claims from risk-averse 
defendants and have the settlement obligation survive the debtor’s 
subsequent bankruptcy. 
 
chapters] does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt” that is listed in this 
section.) (emphasis added); § 1141 (indicating that in a bankruptcy filed under 
Chapter 11 there is no securities laws violations exception to discharge); In re 
WorldCom, Inc., 329 B.R. 10, 13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The simple answer to this 
contention is that Section 523(a)(19) is applicable only to individual debtors.  It has 
no application to corporate debtors such as WorldCom . . . .  If the drafters [of SOX] 
were  indeed  . . . confused . . . it will be for Congress to change the statute, not this 
Court.”); Ebaugh, supra note 54.  
 205  Individuals may have some protection, however, since debts arising from 
securities claims are subordinated to other debts. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2006).  But 
subordination offers little peace of mind since it will only result in the debtor 
avoiding such obligations if the debtor runs out of money to pay other debts.  
Furthermore, an individual who files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 will be able to 
discharge debts for securities law violations that section 523(a)(19) would otherwise 
except from an individual’s discharge.  § 1328.  A “hardship discharge” under 
Chapter 13, however, would not discharge the debt that is excepted by section 
523(a)(19).  § 1328(c).  Accordingly, only individuals who file for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 7, or receive a hardship discharge under Chapter 13, will 
have debt arising from securities law violations excepted from discharge.  For a 
comprehensive yet comprehensible explanation of the various chapters of 
bankruptcy and their respective nuances, see BANKR. JUDGES DIV., supra note 5.   
 206  Yablon, supra note 37, at 571–72.  
 207  See id. at 586.  
 208  Id. at 588.  
 209  See generally Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of 
Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006) (explaining the 
economics of negotiating and settlements).  
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This result is contrary to the general federal policy of 
discouraging private securities claims.  Congress passed the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) because of abusive tactics 
by private securities plaintiffs.210  Since then, case law developed in a 
way that reduces the likelihood that plaintiffs will bring and win civil 
securities suits.211  Private plaintiffs now face procedural barriers and 
are effectively discouraged from using courts to resolve their private 
securities claims.212  It seems odd, therefore, that section 523(a)(19) 
would grant such bargaining power to plaintiffs in private securities 
suits. 
An amendment to the code would alleviate these public policy 
concerns.  First, the windfall to private plaintiffs can easily be avoided.  
Additionally, congressional intent, public policy, and section 
523(a)(19) can all be aligned if an amendment to section 523(a)(19) 
excepts only debt that arises out of fraudulent securities laws 
violations and does not allow an automatic exception for settlements 
entered into with private litigants, unless liability for the fraudulent 
violations is established. 
Such an amendment will avoid section 523(a)(19)’s harsh 
treatment of non-fraudulent, technical violations of securities laws.  
An amendment can stipulate that only debts arising out of violations 
committed with fraudulent intent are non-dischargeable, whether 
they are owed to the government or private plaintiffs.213  By allowing 
private plaintiffs to benefit from this provision, innocent investors 
who obtain judgments or settlements that admit liability against those 
who defrauded them will not be able to be duped again.214  It is 
acceptable to allow private plaintiffs to obtain automatically non-
dischargeable judgments for their securities claims because the facts 
were actually adjudicated after plaintiffs met the heightened 
standards of the PSLRA.215  Moreover, judgments that private 
plaintiffs obtain do not pose the risk that automatically non-
dischargeable settlements do in regards to strong-arming risk-averse 
defendants at the settlement table.216  Likewise, there is no public 
 
 210  PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4 (2006); see also Yablon, supra note 37, at 569.  
 211  Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability, Private 
Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1474 (2009).  
 212  Id.  
 213  See generally Sambur, supra note 63 (arguing that the current version of § 
523(a)(19) only applies to fraudulent violations prosecuted by the government).  
 214  See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
 215  See supra text, accompanying notes 220–22. 
 216  See supra text accompanying notes 205–11. 
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policy concern when settlements that admit liability are automatically 
non-dischargeable.  Additionally, limiting section 523(a)(19) to 
fraudulent violations will remove concerns about punishing innocent 
debtors in technical violation of laws,.217  Such an amendment would 
also align the effects of section 523(a)(19) with congressional intent 
to curb fraud.218 
An amendment could also stipulate that only no-fault 
settlements entered into with government regulators are 
automatically non-dischargeable, and thus private litigants cannot use 
section 523(a)(19) to strong-arm defendants into settling non-
meritorious claims for larger amounts.219  This would resolve the 
inherent tension between the policy goals of the PSLRA—to curb 
frivolous private securities claims—and the current effects of section 
523(a)(19).  Rendering the government the only creditor that can 
obtain automatically non-dischargeable no-fault settlements will also 
prevent some unjust results, like those presented in Art Vandelay’s 
story. 
Limiting section 523(a)(19)’s applicability to no-fault 
settlements with government creditors also aligns the section with 
congressional intent.  Congress passed the section in order to save 
government resources and prevent regulators from having to re-
litigate securities claims against fraudulent debtors.220  Allowing 
private litigants to use section 523(a)(19) to automatically except 
from discharge settlements that do not establish liability does not 
further this purported goal.  While one can argue that by facilitating 
private securities claims through section 523(a)(19) the government 
will be relieved from having to prosecute as many claims and thereby 
save resources, Congress expressly rejected this option when passing 
the PSLRA.221  Accordingly, limiting section 523(a)(19)’s automatic 
exception for no-fault settlements to government-debtors is the only 
way to reconcile congressional intent behind both section 
523(a)(19)’s and PSLRA’s enactments.  Private plaintiffs’ settlements 
may still be found non-dischargeable if the fraudulent violations of 
securities laws are actually proven or admitted to, thus preventing 
fraudsters from utilizing legal loopholes and granting protection to 
 
 217  See Pearson, supra note 4. 
 218  S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002); see also supra Part III.B. 
 219  See generally Yablon, supra note 37, and Grundfest & Huang, supra note 209 
(describing how non-meritorious securities claims force risk-averse defendants to 
settle cases for more than the actual settlement is worth).  
 220  S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002); see also supra Part III.B. 
 221  See supra text accompanying notes 206–09. 
VAN HOUTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2012  2:59 PM 
2012] COMMENT 1743 
 
innocent creditors without running afoul of the policy behind the 
PSLRA.222  Lastly, singling out the government as a preferred creditor 
is not a novel idea, as the bankruptcy code distinguishes between 
government and non-government creditors in other sections.223  Thus, 
proposing an amendment to do so with section 523(a)(19) is not a 
radical suggestion, and any argument that the bankruptcy code 
should treat all creditors equally is a position that Congress has 
already rejected. 
In sum, an amendment that limits non-dischargeability to 
fraudulent securities violations and distinguishes between 
governmental and private creditors with regards to no-fault 
settlements—but still automatically excepts from discharge private 
plaintiffs’ judgments and settlements where liability is otherwise 
established—will remedy the unintended consequences of section 
523(a)(19) and reshape the section to reflect Congress’s original 
intent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In enacting section 523(a)(19), Congress sought to remedy one 
problem but created another.  In its attempt to remedy corporate 
fraud in the wake of Enron and other shocking scandals, it usurped 
important policy considerations—the fresh start, for example—that 
the bankruptcy code is intended to further.  The current securities-
claims exception to discharge, as written in section 523(a)(19) of the 
bankruptcy code, is vague and overbroad.  The plain language seems 
to except from discharge all settlements of securities laws violations 
while simultaneously requiring a definitive finding of liability, which 
settlements often do not provide. 
The vagueness that the poorly crafted language creates is eroded 
upon examination of the legislative intent.  Congress’s intent plainly 
was to except all settlements of securities laws violations from 
discharge in bankruptcy.  This results, however, in a statute that 
harms the innocent and unfortunate debtor while letting some 
culprits run free.  A settlement of a weak case based on alleged 
technical violations will survive a bankruptcy petition and the 
exception is inapplicable to the fraudulent corporations that inspired 
Congress to act.  While Congress’s intentions are laudable, the 
language of the statute does not accurately reflect them.  This stark 
 
 222  See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text. 
 223  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2006) (excepting certain fines owed to the 
government from discharge); see also Sambur, supra note 63. 
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contrast manifested itself recently in Mollasgo.  Mollasgo, driven by 
policy concerns, misinterpreted the true meaning of the securities-
claims exception from discharge.  Its reasoning was based on 
misapplied precedent and faulty distinctions.  Thus, while the 
Mollasgo court’s holding that settlements are excepted from discharge 
only when liability for securities laws violations is established softens 
the inappropriate bite of section 523(a)(19), it does so wrongly 
because it is up to Congress to correct its own mistakes. 
Rather, the legislature must heed the lesson of Mollasgo and 
amend the section to reflect public policy.  The government has a 
legitimate interest in saving resources, but the current statute is 
overbroad and infringes upon the fresh start policy of bankruptcy.  
Policy favors holding Pennypacker to his settlement but not 
Vandelay.  An amendment that distinguishes between no-fault 
settlements with the government and private creditors, as well as 
renders the section inapplicable to non-fraudulent, technical 
violations of the law will strike the proper balance between saving 
government resources while protecting against securities fraud and 
preserving the fresh start for those who deserve it.  Until Congress 
passes an amendment, section 523(a)(19) of the bankruptcy code will 
continue to punish the innocent and allow fraudsters to navigate 
through loopholes. 
 
